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BALANCING FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY WITH WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: 
A COMMENT ON KHAZIN V. TD AMERITRADE 
By 
Faith Van Horn* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In Khazin v. TD Ameritrade,1 an employee of a financial services company filed 
suit against his employer pursuant to a whistleblower protection provision in the Dodd-
Frank Act.2  The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claim, alleging that 
it was within the arbitration agreement signed by the employer and employee.3  The 
Third Circuit held that this whistleblower retaliation claim did not fall within the 
exception in the Dodd-Frank Act prohibiting arbitration of certain types of claims, and 
the Court granted the motion to compel arbitration.4  Although this decision, when taken 
alone, makes the Third Circuit appear to be hospitable to arbitration, it does not actually 
indicate much about the Third Circuit’s stance on arbitration as a general matter.  
However, the case does provide insight into the interaction between the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the federal policy favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA.5  To date, there are few 
federal court decisions dealing with the issue of the arbitrability of Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower claims because the Act is relatively recent, but the Third Circuit’s decision 
in Khazin is consistent with other previously litigated cases. 
II.   BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff-appellant, Boris Khazin (hereafter “Khazin”), is a financial services 
professional who previously worked as an employee of the defendant-appellee, TD 
Ameritrade, Inc. (hereafter “TD”).6  At the beginning of Khazin’s employment, Khazin 
and TD executed an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause in which 
the parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of Khazin’s employment with TD.7 
                                                
*Faith Van Horn is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488 (2014). 
2 Id. at 489 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010)). 
3 Id. at 490. 
4 Id. at 495. 
5 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is 
a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any 
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary”). 
6 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489. 
7 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489. 
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Khazin’s responsibilities at TD involved performing due diligence on the 
financial products offered by the company to ensure compliance with securities 
regulations.8  During the course of his work, Khazin discovered that one of the products 
offered by TD to customers did not comply with certain securities regulations.9  Upon 
making this discovery, Khazin reported the problem to his supervisor, Lule Demmissie, 
along with his recommendations for bringing the product into compliance.10 
Demmissie was initially receptive to Khazin’s concerns, and requested that he 
analyze the “revenue impact” of his proposal.11  When Khazin’s analysis revealed that his 
proposed changes would save customers $2 million, but would cost TD $1.15 million and 
would negatively impact one of Demmissie’s divisions, Demmissie ordered Khazin not to 
make any changes to the product’s pricing.12  Khazin later approached Demmissie again 
to recommend changes to remedy the violation, but again Demmissie told Khazin that 
changes would not be made, and told him to stop contacting her regarding the matter.13 
Over the following months, Demmissie, along with TD’s human resources 
department, approached Khazin about an unrelated billing irregularity that Khazin claims 
had nothing to do with his duties at TD.14  The billing problem turned out to be non-
existent, but nevertheless, Khazin was told that he could no longer be trusted, and TD 
terminated his employment.15 
Khazin initially brought suit against TD in New Jersey state court, alleging state 
law claims and violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, claiming that he was terminated as 
retaliation for whistleblowing.16  The state court dismissed the Dodd-Frank claim for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
Dodd-Frank claims, and compelled arbitration of the state law claims.17 
Khazin then brought his Dodd-Frank claim in federal district court in the District 
of New Jersey, claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act’s Anti-Arbitration Provision (“the 
Provision”) prevents whistleblowers from being compelled to arbitrate their claims.18  
The Provision states that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or 
enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this 
                                                




12Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489-90. 
13 Id. at 489. 
14 Id. at 490. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490. 
18 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490. 
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section.”19  TD argued that (1) the Provision did not forbid arbitration of Khazin’s 
particular type of claim, and (2) the Provision did not apply retroactively to bar 
enforcement of agreements, such as this one, signed before the Act took effect.20  The 
district court found in favor of TD, holding that the Act does not apply retroactively.21  
Khazin now brings an appeal arguing that the arbitration agreement he signed is not 
enforceable under the Provision.22 
III.   COURT’S ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the Third Circuit examined the issue of whether the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision, or any other provision, of the Dodd-Frank Act invalidates the arbitration 
agreement that Khazin signed as part of his employment agreement with TD.23  The 
district court did not reach this issue, instead deciding the case in favor of TD based on 
the non-retroactivity of the Dodd-Frank provisions.24  The Third Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court, but on different grounds, concluding that because Khazin’s 
claim arises under Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Securities Exchange Act (referred to 
in the opinion as the “Dodd-Frank claim”), it does not fall within the specific exemptions 
granted by the Provision.25 
A.  The Dodd-Frank Act Only Adds the Anti-Arbitration Provision to Specific 
Causes of Action 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by examining the history of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and its Anti-Arbitration Provision. Specifically, the Third Circuit distinguished 
causes of action arising under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) from those arising under 
the Dodd-Frank amendments to the Securities Exchange Act (“the Dodd-Frank cause of 
action”).26  The whistleblower protection program was created by the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010 as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and is designed to 
prevent employers from retaliating against employees who provide information to the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), participate in SEC proceedings, or make 
statutorily required disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other securities 
                                                
19 Id. at 490 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2)). 
20 Id. at 490. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490-91.  
24 Id.at 491. 
25 Id. at 494. 
26Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491-92.  
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statutes.27  The Act also created a new cause of action for whistleblowers who have 
suffered retaliation.28  Khazin’s claim arises under this new cause of action.29 
The Third Circuit noted the substantive distinctions between the SOX and the 
Dodd-Frank causes of action for whistleblowers: specifically each “act has its ‘own 
prohibited conduct, statute of limitations, and remedies.’”30  SOX also has an exhaustion 
requirement, which the Dodd-Frank cause of action does not have, and the potential 
remedies under each cause of action are different.31  These distinctions are significant 
because they justify treating claims arising under each of the acts differently.32 
In addition to creating a whistleblower protection provision under the Securities 
Exchange Act, the Dodd-Frank Act also added the Anti-Arbitration Provision to the 
existing whistleblower protection provisions under SOX and the Commodity and 
Exchange Act.33  In both, the provision states that “no predispute arbitration agreement 
shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising 
under this section.”34  However, the Dodd-Frank Act did not include the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision in the new cause of action it created under the Securities Exchange Act.35  This 
is the distinction on which Khazin’s case turned. 
B.  The Language of the Anti-Arbitration Provision Does Not Include Claims 
Arising Under the Dodd-Frank Cause of Action 
The Third Circuit decided that Khazin’s claim failed because it did not arise under 
one of the limited causes of action covered by the Dodd-Frank Anti-Arbitration 
Provision.36   After examining the text and structure of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Third 
Circuit concluded that the Provision only attaches to certain statutory claims, and that 
Khazin’s claim was not one of them.37 
                                                
27  Id.at 491 (quoting Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1174 (2014)). 
28 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491. 
29 Id. 
30 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491 (quoting Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,2 F. Supp 3d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014)). 
31 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491. 
32 Id. at 493. 
33 Id. at 491. 
34 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491-92 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2)). 
35 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 491. 
36 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
37 Id. at 492. 
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1.   The Anti-Arbitration Provision Was Not Applied to the Dodd-Frank 
Cause of Action 
The Third Circuit noted that the Anti-Arbitration Provision enacted as part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is limited in its scope.38  Khazin argued that the Provision referred to his 
cause of action brought under the Dodd-Frank Act.  However, the Third Circuit reasoned 
that the “this section” referred to by the Provision is the section containing the SOX 
cause of action: 39 Section 1514A of Title 18 of the United States Code.40 
In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit examined the structure of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the amendments that it adds to existing statutes.41  Specifically, the Third 
Circuit noted that the Provision specifically prohibits enforcement of predispute 
arbitration agreements relating to disputes “arising under this section.”42  The Court 
reasons that, because the Anti-Arbitration Provision explicitly states that it “amend[s] 
‘Section 1514A of title 18, United States Code by adding that provision at the end,’” the 
“this section” referred to in the Provision is Section 1514A, which contains the SOX 
cause of action.43  Therefore, even though the Dodd-Frank cause of action and the Anti-
Arbitration Provision are located in the same section of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Anti-
Arbitration Provision does not apply to the Dodd-Frank cause of action.   Because 
Khazin’s claim arises under the Dodd-Frank cause of action, the court reasoned, the Anti-
Arbitration Provision did not apply to his claim.44  The text of the Dodd-Frank Act 
explicitly applies the Provision to the SOX cause of action, not broadly to all securities-
related whistleblower causes of action.45 
2.   “When Congress Amends One Statutory Provision But Not Another, It 
is Presumed to Have Acted Intentionally”46 
Khazin argued that the Anti-Arbitration Provision was not attached to the Dodd-
Frank cause of action due to an unintentional omission by Congress because “a bill as 
massive as Dodd-Frank will inevitably contain gaps not intended by Congress.”47  The 
                                                
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2). 
41 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
42 Id. (emphasis in opinion). 
43 Id. at 492 n.3 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. at 1376, 1848 (2010)). 
44 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
45 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010). 
46 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)). 
47 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
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Third Circuit disagreed, reasoning that the fact that Dodd-Frank added the Provision to 
other causes of action but not the Dodd-Frank cause of action indicates “that the omission 
was deliberate.”48  In support this conclusion, the court noted that “the amendments to 
SOX, including the Anti-Arbitration Provision, are adjacent to the Dodd-Frank cause of 
action in the text of Dodd-Frank,” which further shows that the omission was not an 
oversight.49 
C.  The Differences Between the Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Causes of 
Action Justify Treating Claims Arising Under Each of the Acts Differently 
Khazin argued that his Dodd-Frank claim should be treated in the same way as a 
SOX claim, and that not applying the Anti-Arbitration Provision to his claim would 
“undermine Dodd-Frank’s broader purpose” of protecting whistleblowers.50  The Third 
Circuit disagreed, citing the many differences between claims brought under each of the 
causes of action.51  The Court reasoned that applying the purpose of the statute in 
contravention of the literal language of the law could frustrate congressional intent, and 
that the text and structure of the Dodd-Frank Act  were clearly not intended to grant 
Khazin a right to resist arbitration of his claim.52 
The Third Circuit also supported its decision with reference to the “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration.”53 The Third Circuit also noted that courts must enforce 
arbitration agreements as written, including agreements involving statutory rights, unless 
Congress has explicitly overridden the FAA in this regard with a contrary command.54  
Although Congress did override the FAA by appending the Anti-Arbitration Provision to 
some causes of action, the court reasoned, Congress declined to add the Provision to the 
Dodd-Frank cause of action.55  The court therefore concluded that Khazin’s claim was 
arbitrable.56 
                                                
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 493. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 493. 
52 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493. 
53 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)). 
54 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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D.  The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Invalidate All Broadly Worded Arbitration 
Agreements 
Finally, the Third Circuit noted that the district court’s decision to enforce the 
arbitration agreement is consistent with previous cases in which courts interpreted similar 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.57  Khazin argued that a Fourth Circuit case, Santoro v. 
Accenture Federal Services, LLC58 contains language suggesting that the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision invalidates all agreements to arbitrate Dodd-Frank claims.59 The Third Circuit 
rejected this reasoning because such an interpretation would be inconsistent with 
congressional intent as expressed in the FAA, and because the claims in Santoro did not 
involve whistleblower protection, which distinguished those claims from Khazin’s.60 
In support of his claim Khazin also cites a FINRA regulation, which provides that 
whistleblower disputes are not required to be arbitrated pursuant to predispute 
agreements.61  Khazin argued that this FINRA regulation meant that he could not be 
compelled to arbitrate his claim. 62  The Third Circuit, however, looked to regulatory 
notices to conclude that the regulation clearly only applies to claims arising under SOX.63 
IV.   SIGNIFICANCE 
As the Third Circuit noted in Khazin, the Dodd-Frank Act is thousands of pages 
long and adds multiple amendments to several existing statutes.64  As the arguments 
made by plaintiff Khazin illustrate, the scope of some of these amendments is unclear 
without a careful reading of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the provisions of the existing 
statutes that the Act amends.  This case is particularly significant for practitioners in the 
Third Circuit because it definitively establishes that claims arising under the Dodd-Frank 
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act are arbitrable.65  Absent a future action by 
Congress adding an Anti-Arbitration Provision to the Dodd-Frank cause of action, 
practitioners can now know that their clients’ agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of 
Dodd-Frank’s amendments to the Securities Exchange Act will be enforced in the Third 
Circuit. 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 Santoro v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC, 748 F.3d 217 (2014). 
59 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493-94. 
60 Id. at 494. 
61 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 494 (citing Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending FINRA Rules 
13201 and 2263 Relating to Whistleblower Disputes in Arbitration, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,824 (Mar. 12, 2012)). 
62 Id. 
63 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 494. 
64 Id. at 491. 
65 Id. at 492. 
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It is, however, important to note that the Third Circuit’s decision in Khazin does 
not reveal much one way or the other about the Third Circuit’s broader position on 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Given the language and structure of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, the Third Circuit was left with 
no real choice but to enforce the arbitration agreement between Khazin and TD.66  
Because FAA Section 2 requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements as written 
unless there is a contrary command by Congress,67 and because it appears clear from the 
structure and text of the Dodd-Frank act that Congress intentionally did not append the 
Anti-Arbitration Provision to the amended Securities Exchange Act (the Dodd-Frank 
cause of action),68 the only feasible interpretation of Dodd-Frank required the Court to 
enforce the agreement and compel arbitration. 
This case is also of special significance because, so far, the Third Circuit appears 
to be the only Court of Appeals to have ruled on the specific question of the arbitrability 
of claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act as amended by Section 922 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  Other circuits have ruled on the larger question of Dodd-Frank’s effect 
on broadly worded arbitration agreements.69  However, this case is was the first instance 
in which a circuit court was  presented with the specific question of whether and how the 
Anti-Arbitration Provision affects claims arising under statutes amended by Dodd-Frank 
but which do not include the Provision.  After Khazin, practitioners now have the answer 
to that question: whistleblower claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act as 
amended by Dodd-Frank are arbitrable. 
V.   CRITIQUE 
The Dodd-Frank Act targets the financial services sector, with a stated purpose of 
“promot[ing] the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system.”70  Additionally, the Act specifically places the 
Provision in some statutes while leaving it out of others,71 making it indeed unreasonable 
to suggest that the Provision applies to effectively invalidate any broad arbitration 
agreement that could potentially, though does not actually, interfere with the Anti-
Arbitration Provision. Because the Dodd-Frank Act is barely five years old, there is a 
                                                
66 Id. at 492 n.3. 
67 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012). 
68 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
69 For example, Santoro v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC, 748 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. Va. 2014) and Holmes v. 
Air Liquide USA, L.L.C., 498 Fed. Appx. 405 (5th Cir. Tex. 2012) both interpreted Dodd-Frank anti-
arbitration provisions narrowly, applying the provisions only to claims arising under the section of the 
statute to be amended by that portion of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
70 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (2010). 
71 For example, sections in the Dodd-Frank Act that do contain anti-arbitration provisions include § 
922(e)(2) modifying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 748(n)(2) modifying the Commodity and Exchange Act, 
and § 1057(d)(2) discussing employee protection. 
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limited amount of precedent dealing with the arbitrability of claims brought under 
existing statutes that were amended by the Act.  However, to the extent that the issue of 
arbitrability under Dodd-Frank has been litigated, the Third Circuit’s holding in Khazin is 
consistent with previous decisions. 
Early cases addressing the application of the Dodd-Frank amendments to 
arbitration agreements illustrate courts’ unwillingness to allow the Act to be used as a 
broad means of invalidating arbitration agreements.  In Holmes v. Air Liquide USA, 
L.L.C.,72 the Fifth Circuit held that the Dodd-Frank amendments will not invalidate a 
broad arbitration agreement simply because a whistleblower claim has been brought 
under a statute amended by Dodd-Frank.73  The Fifth Circuit noted that if the Anti-
Arbitration Provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act were read to apply to every 
statute that has been amended by Dodd-Frank, even where Dodd-Frank did not add an 
Anti-Arbitration Provision to that statute, this would lead to “unreasonable results.”74  If 
such arguments were successful, the result would be “the untenable conclusion that the 
Act wholesale invalidates all broadly-worded arbitration agreements…even when 
plaintiffs bring wholly unrelated claims.”75   
Two years later, the Fourth Circuit offered an even narrower analysis.  In Santoro 
v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LLC,76 the Fourth Circuit case cited by Khazin in support of his 
argument that the Anti-Arbitration Provision does apply to his claim, the Fourth Circuit 
examined the interaction between the Dodd-Frank Act and FAA Section 2.77  Rather than 
offering support for Khazin’s argument, the Fourth Circuit in Santoro emphasized the 
limited application of the Dodd-Frank Anti-Arbitration Provision to whistleblower claims 
arising under specific statutes amended by Dodd-Frank.78  The court in Santoro 
concluded that the Provision does not apply to any and every claim arising out of the 
employment context.79  The Fourth Circuit in Santoro emphasized that the Anti-
Arbitration Provision only applies to whistleblower claims, holding the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision to be inapplicable because the plaintiff did not bring a whistleblower claim.80  
Although Khazin did bring a whistleblower claim, unlike the plaintiff in Santoro, the 
Santoro case still serves to emphasize the limited scope of the several Anti-Arbitration 
                                                
72 Holmes v. Air Liquide, L.L.C., 498 Fed. Appx. 405 (2012). 
73 Holmes, 498 Fed. Appx. at 406. 
74 Id. at 407. 
75 Holmes, 498 Fed. Appx. at 407. 
76 Santoro v. Accenture Fed. Servs., LCC, 748 F.3d 217 (2014). 
77 Santoro, 748 F.3d at 221. 
78 Id. at 223. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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Provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act by upholding the arbitrability of disputes 
under statutes to which the Dodd-Frank Act did not add an anti-arbitration provision.81 
The Third Circuit in Khazin took this analysis of the application of the Anti-
Arbitration Provision one step further. The court in Khazin emphasized that not only does 
the Provision only apply to whistleblower claims, but it is also limited by the text and 
structure of the Act to specifically defined whistleblower claims.82 
The Third Circuit also cited two district court cases, Ruhe v. Masimo Corp83 and 
Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC,84 both of which also involved claims arising under the Dodd-
Frank cause of action.  In Ruhe, as in Khazin, the plaintiff argued that the Anti-
Arbitration Provision was unintentionally omitted as the result of a mere “drafting 
error.”85  The court in Ruhe disagreed, noting that Congress later proposed further 
amendments to the statute which did not include an anti-arbitration provision.86  In 
Murray, the court held that there was not enough evidence to show that Congress 
unintentionally omitted the Anti-Arbitration Provision.  Rather, the Murray court 
reasoned, the differences between the Dodd-Frank cause of action and the SOX cause of 
action, which does contain the Provision, indicated that the omission was intentional.87 
In Khazin, the Third Circuit rested its holding primarily on the text and structure 
of the amendments Dodd-Frank adds to existing statutes.88  The Court focused on the 
plain meaning of the Act.  This analysis led the court to conclude that because Congress 
did not include the Anti-Arbitration Provision in the amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act, Congress did not intend for the Anti-Arbitration Provision to be applied to 
claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act.89  This holding leaves the door open 
for Congress to add the Anti-Arbitration Provision to the Securities Exchange Act 
amendments if Congress did indeed intend for the Provision to apply to claims arising 
under that cause of action. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The plain language and the structure of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments compel 
the conclusion that the omission of the Anti-Arbitration Provision from the Dodd-Frank 
cause of action was intentional and not the result of a drafting error.  Therefore, the Third 
                                                
81 Id. at 224. 
82 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
83 Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104811 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011). 
84 Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9696 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014). 
85 Ruhe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104811 at *12-13. 
86 Id. at *14. 
87 Murray, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9696 at *23-27. 
88 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492. 
89 Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493. 
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Circuit may not read in the Anti-Arbitration Provision and apply it to Khazin’s claim.  If 
Congress indeed intended for the Provision to apply to the Dodd-Frank cause of action, 
Congress can amend this section to include the provision.  But, until Congress takes such 
action, agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Dodd-Frank cause of action will 
be upheld in the Third Circuit.
